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US COAST GUARD FOR USCG ACTIVITIES/MIO EUROPE MBEE
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TAGS: ETTC MNUC PARL KSTC KNNP YM MARITIME SECURITY
SUBJECT: EXBS ADVISOR VISIT AND PROGRAM STRATEGY JULY, 2005

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.4 b and d.

11. (U) SUMMARY. During the period July 9-19, 2005, Export Controls and Related Border Security (EXBS) Advisor met with Yemeni officials and principal Embassy staff to discuss the current state of EXBS in Yemen. Advisor met with senior representatives of the Ministry of Interior, the Yemen and Aden Free Zone Public Authority, the Coast Guard, the Border Guards, the National Atomic Energy Commission and the port officials in Aden and Hodeidah. The Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG) provides excellent support to the traditional EXBS program. Other Yemeni organizations would like to replicate the success of the YCG and are anxious to receive EXBS assistance in training and equipment procurement. END SUMMARY.

MEETING SUMMARIES

12. (U) On July 9-19, EXBS Advisor met with principal US Embassy staff to discuss the state of EXBS in Yemen. Salient points of subsequent conversation were as follows:

As in other countries of the region, EXBS infrastructure is lacking in Yemen. Border Guards and Customs are undermanned, ill equipped, and generally poorly trained. These deficiencies are exacerbated by prevalent corruption.

Due to the long-term presence of a US Coast Guard Liaison Officer, (CAPT Robert D. Innes, USCG, US Maritime Advisor Southwest Asia/East Africa,) the YCG has developed into a professional service that forms the backbone of the Yemeni Export Controls System. The YCG has traditional missions of maritime security, safety, protection of the environment, movement and development of maritime traffic, and a coastal national defense role. The YCG differs from the USCG in five ways: (1) it has no ice breaking mission, (2) it is not the lead agency for search and rescue (this is the charter of the Ministry of Transportation), (3) it has no repair or maintenance role with respect to buoys and light houses, (4) it has no regulatory role and (5) it has no customs role.

The YCG is under the Ministry of Interior and as such has arrest authority. Its officers and sailors are law enforcement officers with responsibilities and authorities that end at the shoreline.

The YCG has received significant support from the US as well as European and Asian allied states.

The success of the YCG is the envy of the Yemeni government. Current discussions among various Yemeni officials are exploring the possibility of facilitating the replication of this success with a specialized Border Guard element and a cleaned-up and modernized customs service. Yemeni officials are aware one of the main reasons the YCG was effective in developing into a professional service was because a resident USCG expert helped prepare a detailed and realistic ten year development plan with achievable milestones.

Country team believes similar development among the border guard and customs elements of Yemen can be enhanced by the presence of a resident subject matter expert (perhaps from DHS-CPB) who will work with the Yemenis on a day-to-day basis as CAPT Innes did with the YCG.

13. (U) On July 12, EXBS Advisor met with the following officials of the Coast Guard Authority, Ministry of Interior: Brigadier General Ali A. Rasa, a, Chairman (Commander); Brigadier General Saleh A. Mujally, Vice Chairman (Deputy Commander); Colonel Ali M. Alsubhi, General Operations Manager and Colonel Fouad S. S. Ba-Suliman, Director of Communications. Salient points of subsequent conversation were as follows:

The Yemeni ports are the &door to the world& for Yemen and its citizens. Maritime controls will have the most immediate effect in terms of creating a viable and effective export controls system. Once maritime controls are in place then Yemeni officials should give attention to creating similar

capacity to secure land borders and then commercial land portals. An integrated national maritime operations network will provide the best means to monitor the majority of movements of both cargo and persons into and out of Yemen.

The Yemeni government expects to create similar systems of control for Yemeni airspace and land borders.

The YCG has received substantial support for the US and other allied naval and coast guard services.

The YCG still needs assistance in the following areas:

- a. Communications Equipment
- b. Classroom furniture and teaching Aids for YCG Academy
- c. Spare parts and tools for fleet maintenance
- d. Portable buildings for offices and billeting at existing and future operational bases
- e. Computer network for operations center in Sana'a and the planned district operations centers in Hodeidah, Aden, Mukalla, Al-Salif, Al-Mokha, and Bir Ali
- f. Permanent piers at select operational sites

The YCG has adopted the USCG doctrine of making engineering and logistics the driving force and basis for design of force structure and operations. To continue their export controls mission, the YCG will need additional logistical support in terms of upgraded boats/ships and maintenance equipment to maintain inventory and prolong operational life of the fleet.

In addition to equipment, tools and perishable supplies, the YCG needs experienced enlisted technicians, mechanics, machinists and supply specialists to come to Yemen on extended assignment to teach their enlisted counterparts the practices and procedures that will lengthen the serviceable life of the fleet.

The Yemeni government is using the YCG as a model for export controls and related security organization on a national level and with regional allies such as Kenya, Djibouti and Eritrea.

14. (U) On July 12, EXBS Advisor met with Brigadier General Abdul Illah Atif, Director (Commander) of the Border Guards, Ministry of Defense. Salient points of subsequent conversation were as follows:

The Border Guards (BG) is a 1700 man paramilitary unit charged with patrolling and securing the land borders and select coastal regions. Effectiveness in the north and northeast tribal areas is problematic due to the influence and control of tribal leaders and the ruggedness of the mountain and desert terrain.

Some cooperation with Saudi officials occurs along common land borders.

In the past, the BG recruited members from the tribal areas to assist in improving their operational success in the tribal regions. This practice has now stopped. The BG does not have a professional recruitment process.

The BG requested assistance in the following areas:

- a. Prefabricated buildings for Border posts
- b. Generators for power at border facilities
- c. Communications Equipment
- d. Patrol vehicles
- e. Optic, including binoculars, night vision and static sensors, and
- f. Training for border operations

15. (U) On July 13, EXBS Advisor met with the following officials of the National Atomic Energy Commission (NATEC), Dr. Moustafa Yahia Bahran, Science and Technology Advisor to the President and Chairman of the NATEC and Eng. Khaled Abdullah Al-Ahmed, Director General Registration, Licensing and Radiation Inspection Directorate. Salient points of subsequent conversation were as follows:

The Yemeni government is currently reviewing a law to transfer the charter for radiological and nuclear licensing from the Ministry of Health to NATEC. Most of these sources are medical and dental in nature. A few sources are resident in the physics laboratories of Sana'a University.

NATEC has 13 personnel certified by an IAEA sponsored program resident at the University of Damascus.

IAEA has chosen Yemen as a regional center for its programs and nonproliferation initiatives. In May, NATEC hosted the first workshops for &RIAS III,8 the IAEA Regulatory Authority Information System.

Yemen claims to have an &excellent8 control system for radiological sources since there are only 200 sources in

country. Yemen has no graveyard, for depleted sources. All depleted sources are re-exported to original suppliers.

The Yemen Government and NATEC are currently reviewing a proposed Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. Department of Energy concerning the placement of specialized monitoring equipment at the ports of Aden and Hodeidah, the international airports of Sana'a and Aden and the northern land border crossing with Saudi Arabia located at Harath. According to a scientific study conducted by NATEC, placement of proper equipment at these sites will address 80% of the problem.⁸ (NOTE: Although NATEC assertion of 80% coverage of the problem may be true, this is only 80% of the potential radiological, problem since the sensors in question will not detect other substances of concern and the current border security and customs elements appear, according to country team, to be ineffective and inconsistent in their assigned roles.)

NATEC had a detailed and phased plan for development and implementation of a national radiological detection infrastructure. Officials of NATEC are willing to discuss this plan in detail with US officials of the Department of Energy subsequent to appropriate request and approval of official exchange of information.

NATEC is concerned about the possibility of storage and/or transshipment of radiological/nuclear items or related dual-use technology in or through Yemen. Officials of NATEC believe there is troubling linkage⁸ between the illicit drugs trade, scam marketing of Red Mercury, and smuggling infrastructure that could be used to smuggle radiological materials or other WMD or related technology.

At some point in the future as Yemeni oil reserves are depleted, Yemen may need to invite representatives from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Yemen to discuss policies and procedures for peaceful use of nuclear power for generation of electricity.

16. (U) On July 13, EXBS Advisor met with Brigadier General Ahmed Al-Sunidar, Director General of the Office of the Interior Minister, Ministry of Interior. Salient points of subsequent conversation were as follows:

The national priority is to complete the plan for coastal security begun by the YCG.

The Ministry is considering creation of an elite Border Guard element to replace the existing Ministry of Defense Border Guards. Should the ministry stand up this unit, it intends to use the YCG model to create a professional, trustworthy and efficient border element to mirror the maritime success of the YCG. The Ministry may want to begin with a 100-man unit and deploy to select sites along the border as a proof of principle.

(NOTE: Should the Ministry of Interior proceed with this plan to create an elite land-based law Enforcement element to mirror the YCG, EXBS support can be leveraged if an appropriate U.S. subject matter expert is assigned to Yemen for two to three years to assist in the establishment of a viable border protection element from the ground up.)

17. (U) On July 18, EXBS Advisor toured the port of Aden and met with the following officials of the Aden District, Coast Guard Authority, Ministry of Interior: Staff Colonel Lotf A. H. Al-Baraty, General Director (Commander); Major Shugaa, Operations Officer and other select staff members not identified by name or title. Salient points of subsequent conversation were as follows:

At present, YCG patrol zones generally extend to ten miles but the YCG would like to increase that distance to monitor maritime smuggling more effectively. To increase the patrol zone, the YCG needs larger vessels than those now in inventory

The YCG needs logistical support, both in terms of equipment and resident technicians, mechanics and machinists to train the YCG enlisted cadre.

Some Evinrude outboard engines have proven to be consistently unreliable, while Yamaha model 200 outboard motors have endured the operational requirements well. (Note: EXBS Advisor will provide photographs of respective motors to NP/ECC under separate cover.)

Some basic search and rescue equipment is available in inventory but personnel need additional training in S&R operations.

18. (U) On July 18, EXBS Advisor toured the Aden container terminal and met with the following officials: Mr. Kor Ler Hian, General Manager/Senior Manager (Engineering), OPM Aden, Aden Container Terminal and Mr. Adnan M. O. Al-Kaff, Director for Corporate Affairs and Senior Manager-Human Resources, OPM

Aden, Aden Container Terminal. Salient points of subsequent conversation were as follows:

No checks on transshipments currently exist. Yemeni Customs seals the container before entry into the terminal and no one opens them again. The Container Terminal operations personnel only check for unbroken seals and correct paperwork.

Less than 1% of the terminal cargo goes to the United States. The U.S. provides no significant imports to Yemen via the terminal. Most of the terminal traffic is imports to Yemen, much of which is foodstuffs and textiles.

Most truckers belong to small and privately owned companies. Yemeni and port security screen all truckers before they enter the port facility and then again before they enter the container terminal. Companies with multiple trucks apply for driver passes for their employees. Private truckers apply on their own.

Night security at the container terminal includes lights, cameras, a two-meter fence, and roving unarmed guards.

Existing protocols for handling a &problem container⁸ are written and practiced. The specific problem or alert, on the container dictates if the terminal officials contact the YCG or other specialized elements of the Ministry of Interior and the Yemeni security services. Occasionally jurisdictional confusion in the port and the terminal complicates operations since the Free Zone Security reports to the Free Zone Manager and other governmental elements, including the YCG, report to the Ministry of Interior and the office of the Governor of Aden.

There is little incentive for authorities to invest in the Free Zone since investment undermines profitable smuggling activity.

The terminal needs to improve its security in terms of an ability to scan containers for illicit radiological, chemical and biological materials and related technology or components.

(NOTE: The Container terminal is modern. Equipment is new. Design of the Terminal lends itself to application and installation of chokepoint sensor arrays.,)

19. (U) On July 18, EXBS Advisor toured met with the following officials of the Yemen Free Zone Public Authority (YFZPA), located in Aden: Dr. Mohammad Hamood Alwadan, Vice Chairman, YFZPA and Mr. Mohammad M. Zemam, Manager, Port Cities Development Program, YFZPA. Salient points of subsequent conversation were as follows:

Dubai Ports International (DPI) out of Dubai, United Arab Emirates is the developer of YFZPA. Development plans exist to link the container terminal to the international airport to improve processing of air cargo.

Aden is not off the &ports at risk list.⁸ (NOTE: YFZPA did not identify the exact list referenced, but given the context of their comment it is probably a port/shipping risk list prepared by shipping insurance companies such as Lloyds of London.)

YFZPA is seeking individual investors to handle development of specific sectors of the free zone to include tourism, heavy industry and manufacturing, shipping, recycling and petro-chemical storage and refinement.

The steel recycling plant is due to open in late August 2005.

(NOTE: Dr. Alwadan provided Advisor an English copy of the Free Zone law No 4 of the year 1993 and a copy of the YFZPA 2004 Aden Free Zone Facilities and Incentives/Investment & Development Opportunities Brochure.)

10. (C) On July 18, EXBS Advisor met with Mr. Basher Bashaheel, Operating Manager, Al-Ayyam Newspaper, (the only independent daily newspaper in Yemen.) Salient points of subsequent conversation were as follows:

Smuggling of diesel fuel is big business in Aden. According to investigative reporting, smugglers typically buy fuel at \$120 per ton and sell it for \$425 per ton.

An organized criminal element controls all facets of the supply chain in the port of Aden.

English-Arabic translation of shipping documentation is a &magnet⁸ for corruption. Pay the right person and the documentation can say anything it needs to say. There are few existing checks and balances for translation verses reality of cargo.

Many are of the opinion that the Yemeni Customs is the single

worst obstacle to foreign investment due to their rampant corruption.

The commercial courts need a "major overhaul." Citizens need to have the right to sue government officials and Ministers need to be accountable to institutions and the public.

Omani officials are willing to work closely with Yemeni officials to improve border security. Perhaps the Yemeni government could use future success along the Omani-Yemeni border to build a model for border operations and improve the security along the northern border with Saudi Arabia in the Harath region.

¶11. (U) On July 19, EXBS Advisor toured the port of Hodeidah and met with the following officials: Colonel Abdulla Al-Hamadani, Director General of Security) Hodeidah Port, Hodeidah District, Coast Guard Authority, Ministry of Interior and Mr. Musa Dal Mohneg (sic), Yemeni Governmental Manager of the Hodeidah Container Terminal and other select staff members not identified by name or title. Salient points of subsequent conversation were as follows:

Cargo entering the port is mainly grain, wood and iron for internal Yemeni consumption.

(NOTE: Port facilities appear to be 15-20 years old and in a general state of disrepair and visible decline. Advisor saw no evidence of recent capital improvement in the port or its facilities.)

¶12. (C) On July 19, EXBS Advisor intended to tour the Harath border crossing, but the trip was cancelled due to a country-wide ROYG ban on diplomatic travel for security reasons. (NOTE: On July 20, 2005, riot erupted at several locations in Yemen due to government cessation of fuel subsidies.)

EXBS COUNTRY STRATEGY

¶13. Following meetings, tours and extensive discussions with Yemeni and U.S officials, Advisor recommends the following strategy for EXBS in Yemen:

¶A. (U) Fund acquisition and installation of computer equipment for the Yemeni Coast Guard National Operations Center at its headquarters in Sana'a. This project would cost around \$100,000 and would cover approximately 100 workstations, 6 servers, situation monitors and related cabling or wireless connections. The six servers would be dedicated to classified and unclassified nodes of the operation center, communications, email and applications. Embassy has identified a trusted and competent contractor, which has done excellent work on behalf of the Embassy on other projects. This operations center would provide the automated infrastructure for the YCG to perform its EXBS mission. The existence of this center would then provide the Yemen government a model on which to build an effective land-based export controls and related border security element.

¶B. (C) Due to existing complications of jurisdiction and localized control in the northern tribal areas. EXBS should insist border monitoring sensors be placed on the Saudi side of the border where they are more likely to be protected from damage or theft. Assistance programs can augment a Saudi-side sensor array system with a mid-size and non-lethal unmanned remote piloted vehicle system such as the Hunter vehicle on the Yemeni side of the border. After appropriate training, an appropriate element like the border guard/law enforcement unit the Ministry of Interior is considering could operate and secure the system. The system could effectively monitor corridors of ingress and egress identified with smuggling operations. The product of such a system could be linked to a Yemeni Quick Reaction Law Enforcement unit empowered to respond, seal a localized area, seize as appropriate and extract before smuggling or tribal forces could mass and respond. The product of this system could also easily be rendered omni-directional, ensuring U.S. capability to monitor the take..

¶C. (U) Due to the unique challenges of the Yemeni land borders, success in the creation of a land-based export controls and related border security element will be enhanced by the long-term presence of a resident subject matter expert familiar with border operations and state-of-the art technology such as the Hunter system. Advisor recommends the interagency group seriously consider funding such a position.

Advisor also recommend such an individual be capable and willing to spend extended periods in the field with Yemen units. Advisor further suggests this expert be someone who has successfully performed in the EPIC/JTF6 environment and who is familiar with both the technological and human challenges of maintaining effective border security operations along an extensive and rugged land border.

¶D. (C) Some training for Yemen elements may be more

effectively and efficiently conducted via Jordanian joint-training facilities. Advisor recommends EXBS explore this option.

E. (C) Cooperation between Saudi and Yemeni officials has historically been difficult, but, it may be possible to engage Saudi Arabia in the EXBS arena by proposing they erect a border monitoring sensor array and share the take, with Yemeni officials in return for the Yemeni officials sharing their take, from the Hunter)type system. Perhaps, Yemen can make similar arrangements with Oman, i.e., have the Omanis place static sensor arrays on their side of the border and then exchange the product of both the static and URPV systems between relevant EXBS elements in Oman and Yemen.

F. (U) Facilitate U.S. Department of Energy CORE/SLD Program and MEGAPORTS Initiative engagement with Yemen and its NATEC.

G.(U) Once the YCG is established, a mirror land-based EXBS element in place and the NATEC monitoring infrastructure up and running, Embassy officials can develop appropriate policy discussions with Yemeni officials on the reform of the Customs service and EXBS can stand ready to support a reformed Customs service, providing relevant training and equipment to control the commercial portals of Yemen.

14. (U) Any questions or comments can be directed to Joseph **C. Irvine**, EXBS Advisor to Jordan & the Middle East, Telephone:(962 6) 590-6550/6558, Fax: (962 6) 592-7653, Email: IrvineJC@state.gov.

15. (U) Cable cleared by Joseph Irvine, AMEMBASSY Jordan. Krajeski